This paper explores whether and why misvaluation affects corporate investment by comparing tangible and intangible investments; and by using a price-based misvaluation proxy that filters out scale and earnings growth prospects. Capital, and especially R&D expenditures increase with overpricing; but only among overvalued firms. The sensitivity of R&D to misvaluation is stronger among small, high-turnover, and financially unconstrained firms. This evidence supports several implications of the misvaluation hypothesis of investment. This paper explores whether and why misvaluation affects corporate investment by comparing tangible and intangible investments; and by using a price-based misvaluation proxy that filters out scale and earnings growth prospects. Capital, and especially R&D expenditures increase with overpricing; but only among overvalued firms. The sensitivity of R&D to misvaluation is stronger among small, high-turnover, and financially unconstrained firms. This evidence supports several implications of the misvaluation hypothesis of investment.
Introduction
Both efficient and inefficient market theories imply that higher stock prices should be associated with higher corporate investment. Under the q theory of investment (Tobin (1969) ), markets are efficient, so that a high stock price reflects strong growth opportunities. It follows that a high-priced firm should invest more.
Under what we call the misvaluation hypothesis, firms respond to overvaluation by investing more. Equity overvaluation can stimulate investment by encouraging the firm to raise more equity capital (Stein (1996) , Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) , Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) ), thereby exploiting equity purchasers for the benefit of existing shareholders. 1 Owing to managerial agency problems, the additional cash raised may encourage greater investment. Alternatively, if the market overvalues the firm's new investment opportunities, the firm may commit to additional investment in order to obtain a high price for newly issued equity.
However, the misvaluation hypothesis does not require equity issuance. If a manager likes having a high short run stock price even at the expense of long-term value, he may invest heavily in order to stimulate or cater to optimistic market expectations (Stein (1996) , Polk and Sapienza (2006) , Jensen (2005) ).
In this paper we test the misvaluation hypothesis using an approach designed to distinguish rational from misvaluation effects, and to probe the sources of misvaluation effects. This approach is to identify and a single overall measure of misvaluation and test whether it forecasts investment. One possible measure of misvaluation is the firms ex post abnormal stock return. However, this measure confounds the possibilities that misvaluation causes investment, or that investment causes misvaluation. Thus, a more appealing approach is to measure misvaluation using ex ante proxies, such as the prior ratio of some fundamental measure to market price.
A distinctive feature of how we identify misvaluation as a predictor of investment is that we examine the deviation of market price from a forward-looking measure of fundamental value. 2 Doing so filters from our misvaluation proxy much of the contaminating 1 Several authors provide evidence suggesting that firms time new equity issues to exploit market misvaluation, or manage earnings to induce such misvaluation-see, e.g., Ritter (1991) , Loughran and Ritter (1995) , Wong (1998b, 1998a) , Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998) , Baker and Wurgler (2000) , Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2006) and Dong, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2007) . There is also evidence that overvaluation is associated with greater use of equity as a means of payment in takeover (Dong et al. (2006) ).
2 In this respect our approach differs from that of Schaller (2001, 2006) , who develop effects of information about future profits. Removing such contamination is crucial, since, as the q theory of investment implies, current investment should increase with the quality of investment opportunities; and because firms with better management teams optimally should invest more. In this respect our misvaluation measure minimizes the confounding of growth prospects and misvaluation effects that is present in many past studies of the stock market and investment.
To do so, we apply the residual income model of Ohlson (1995) to obtain a measure of fundamental value, sometimes called 'intrinsic value' (V ), and measure misvaluation by V /P , the deviation of market price from this value. 3 Intrinsic value reflects not just current book value, but a discounted value of analyst forecasts of future earnings. Since intrinsic value reflects growth prospects and opportunities, normalizing market price by intrinsic value filters out much of the extraneous effects of information about the firms future profitability to provide a purified measure of misvaluation.
In contrast, misvaluation measures such as Tobin's q or equity market-to-book rely for their fundamental benchmarks on a backward looking value measure, book value. Book fundamental measures do not incorporate current information about the prospects for future profitability. Thus, such valuation ratios therefore reflect information about the ability of the firm to generate high returns on its existing assets or future investments. Indeed, many studies have viewed Tobin's q or related variables as proxies for earnings growth prospects, investment opportunities, or managerial effectiveness. So it is hard to distinguish misvaluation from other rational effects based solely on q or market-tobook as misvaluation measures. 4 Furthermore, Tobin's q is a measure of total firm misvaluation or growth prospects. A better measure of the firm's access to underpriced equity capital is its equity misvaluation.
Training a purer measure of misvaluation upon the misvaluation/investment relationship is only one of the two main purposes of this paper. The other main purpose is structural models of stock prices under efficient markets, in order to measure market misvaluation and its effect on corporate investment in Japan and the U.S.
3 This measure of misvaluation has been applied in a number of studies to the prediction of subsequent returns (Frankel and Lee (1998) , and Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) ), repurchases (D'Mello and Shroff (2000) ), and takeover-related behaviors (Dong et al. (2006) ). 4 To the extent that our purification is imperfect, variation in our purified measure would still reflect firm growth rather than misvaluation. If this problem were severe we would expect our measure to have a high absolute correlation with q. In our sample, the correlation with q is not especially strong (−0.274). Nevertheless, as a further precaution, we additionally control for growth prospects as proxied by book-to-market in our tests.
to probe the economic sources of these effects. We do so in two ways. First, we test the distinctive predictions of the misvaluation hypothesis for tangible versus intangible investments. Second, we examine how investment sensitivities to misvaluation vary across size, financial constraint, turnover, and valuation subsamples.
With regard to the first issue, we identify a sharp contrast between the effect of misvaluation on the creation of intangible assets through R&D investment and the effect on the creation of tangible assets through capital expenditures. 5 This is an important topic, since R&D is a source of business innovation, and quantitatively is a major component of corporate investment. Indeed, in our sample, beginning in the mid-1990's R&D constitutes a larger fraction of corporate investment than capital expenditures.
Under the misvaluation hypothesis, measured misvaluation should be most strongly related to the form of investment that investors are most prone to misvaluing. Intangible investments such as R&D have relatively uncertain payoff, and therefore are relatively hard to value compared to capital expenditures. 6 So the misvaluation hypothesis suggests that equity misvaluation should be associated more strongly with misperceptions about R&D than about capital expenditures. In consequence, intangible investment projects provide managers with more effective tools for catering to investor overoptimism about project misvaluation. Thus, the misvaluation hypothesis predicts a stronger relation between misvaluation and R&D expenditures than between misvaluation and capital expenditures.
To test the misvaluation hypothesis, we perform regressions each year and pool the estimates across time as in Fama and MacBeth (1973) . We find that more positive mispricing tends to be associated with greater capital expenditures and, strongly, greater R&D. These findings remain after controlling for several other possible determinants of investment, including growth opportunities (proxied by q or equity book-to-market) 7 , 5 The primary dependent variable in previous literature on misvaluation is the level of capital expenditures. Polk and Sapienza (2006) use the firm characteristic of high versus low R&D as a conditioning variable in some of their tests of the relation between misvaluation and capital expenditures. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) examine several measures of investment, one of which is the sum of capital expenditures and R&D, but do not examine whether misvaluation affects capital expenditures and R&D differently. 6 Psychological evidence suggests that biases such as overconfidence are more severe in activities (such as long-term research and product development) for which feedback is deferred and highly uncertain; see, e.g., Einhorn (1980) . In the investment model of Panageas (2005) , investment is most affected by market valuations when the disagreement about the marginal product of capital is greatest. Furthermore, there is evidence that greater valuation uncertainty is associated with stronger behavioral biases in the trades of individual investors Kumar (2006) . 7 Tobin's q and equity book-to-market should be correlated with misvaluation as well as growth. Controlling for these variables therefore provides conservative tests for misvaluation effects. cash flow, leverage, and return volatility. In regression tests, the sensitivity of R&D to misvaluation is about 4-5 times greater than the sensitivity of capital expenditures.
This evidence is potentially consistent with the hypothesis that overvaluation induces firms to raise cheap equity capital to finance investment, as in the models of Stein (1996) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) . It is also potentially consistent with the catering perspective of Jensen (2005) and Polk and Sapienza (2006) , wherein investment can be undertaken to boost the short-term stock price.
To further probe the sources of misvaluation effects, we examine different subsamples sorted based upon measures of financial constraints, share turnover, firm size, and the degree of misvaluation, which, under different hypotheses, should affect the strength of the misvaluation/investment relation. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) find that the capital expenditures of equity-dependent firms (where equity-dependence is measured using the index of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ) have greater sensitivity than the capital expenditures of less constrained firms to Tobins q. Using our purified measure of misvaluation, equity V /P , we find that the R&D expenditures of more constrained firms (high KZ index) are less sensitive to market misvaluation than that of less constrained firms.
This finding offers an intriguing puzzle. A possible explanation is that distressed firms are ill-positioned to take advantage of opportunities to build intangible assets, both because such assets generate real options that require future financial flexibility, and because stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, or customers are reluctant to commit to long-term relationships (Titman (1984) ). Indeed, Bhagat and Welch (1995) find an inverse relationship between leverage and R&D among U.S. firms. The absence of complementary inputs from stakeholders for such initiatives suggests that among financially constrained (high-KZ) firms R&D will be less sensitive to overvaluation than among low-KZ firms. Polk and Sapienza (2006) propose that the sensitivity of investment to misvaluation should be higher when managers have a stronger focus on short-run stock prices, because a short term horizon makes overvalued projects more attractive. Polk and Sapienza use turnover as a proxy for short-term focus by shareholders. We find that the sensitivity of R&D, but not capital expenditures, to misvaluation is higher among high-turnover firms. This suggests that pressures to maintain short-term valuation are more important for intangible than for tangible investment. Our finding for capital expenditures contrasts with Polk and Sapienza's finding (based on a different proxy for misvaluation) of higher sensitivity among high-turnover firms; see footnote 23.
There are also reasons to expect the effects of misvaluation on investment to depend on firm size. Small firms should be prone to misvaluation because of lower transparency and ease of arbitrage. Furthermore, small firms should face more severe catering pressures, because of threats of takeover and delisting. However, small firms have less access to equity markets, potentially limiting their ability to fund investment with overvalued equity. We find that small firms have higher sensitivity of R&D, but not capital expenditures, to misvaluation than large firms. The stronger effect of R&D suggests that catering (which is likely to be especially important for intangible investments) is more important for small firms.
Finally, when there are fixed costs of issuing equity, the misvaluation hypothesis implies that overvalued firms will issue more frequently than undervalued firms. A marginal shift in misvaluation only affects the size of new issue for firms that are issuing a positive amount. In a sample that includes both firms that do and do not issue, we therefore expect a relatively small mean marginal effect of greater valuation on investment among undervalued firms. In contrast, among overvalued firms for which positive issuance is more frequent, we expect an increase in overvaluation to have a greater marginal effect on the scale of issuance and investment. A similar point holds if investment projects have a minimum efficient scale.
A different line of reasoning is that managers of overvalued firms are particularly anxious to undertake overvalued investments in order to cater to optimistic investor perceptions (Jensen (2005) ). This argument leads to the same conclusion, that misvaluation has a stronger average marginal effect on investment among overvalued firms.
We test this hypothesis by sorting firms based upon V /P ratios, and examining the relation of investment to valuation within quintiles. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find that it is only among overvalued firms that misvaluation affects capital expenditures, R&D, or total investment.
A previous literature provides evidence as to whether investment is associated with misvaluation. For example, capital expenditures or changes in capital expenditures negatively predict future abnormal stock returns (Polk and Sapienza (2006) , Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) ), consistent with high-investment firms being overvalued. There is also evidence suggesting that R&D or changes in R&D positively predict returns (Lev and Sougiannis (1996) , Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001) , Penman and Zhang (2002) , Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2004) ).
However, as mentioned earlier, return tests do not distinguish whether misvaluation causes investment (the misvaluation hypothesis) from the alternative possibility that investment induces misvaluation. For example, if investors are overly enthusiastic about firms that undertake heavy capital expenditures, then firms that undertook high capital expenditures would become overvalued and would earn abnormally low subsequent returns, even if misvaluation had no effect on the firms investment decision. A key advantage of our approach to testing the misvaluation hypothesis relative to return prediction is that it eliminates this reverse causality by testing only how preexisting misvaluation affects subsequent investment.
Other past literature tests whether market valuations affect investment by examining whether stock prices have incremental predictive power above and beyond proxies for the quality of growth opportunities such as cash flow or firm profitability (Barro (1990) , Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) , Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) , and Welch and Wessels (2000)). Bhagat and Welch (1995) find a weak link between past returns and R&D expenditures among U.S. firms. Such tests do not clearly distinguish the q theory of investment from the misvaluation hypothesis, since, even after controlling for profits, stock prices (or past returns) can reflect investment opportunities.
More recent papers have used indirect approaches to test for the effects of misvaluation on investment. One approach is to examine whether tight financial constraints make investment more sensitive to firm value. Motivated by an extension of the model of Stein (1996) , Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) find, consistent with their model, that the investment of financially constrained, or 'equity-dependent' firms is more sensitive to stock prices than that of firms that are not financially constrained.
This evidence is consistent with the idea that misvaluation affects investment more when the only effective way to fund investment is to raise new equity capital. However, Baker et al's misvaluation measure, Tobin's q, is also a measure of prospects for profit growth. Thus, an alternative interpretation of this evidence that better profit growth prospects increase investment more among financially constrained firms. 8 Another approach to testing the misvaluation hypothesis is to relate investment to variables that are expected to correlate with misvaluation, such as discretionary accruals (Polk and Sapienza (2006) ), and dispersion in analyst forecasts of earnings (Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) ). These papers provide several findings consistent with misvaluation effects. 9 The intuitions for these variables as misvaluation proxies are appealing. 10 However, such tests are still indirect in the sense that they focus upon particular hypothesized correlates of misvaluation, rather than trying to measure directly the overall misvaluation of the firm's equity. 11
Data and Methodology
Our initial data sample includes all U.S. firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ that are covered by CRSP and COMPUSTAT during 1966 to 2005 . The residual income model value to price (V /P ) ratio also requires that firms be covered by I/B/E/S for earnings forecasts data, in addition to possessing the necessary accounting items. We further require each valid firm-year observation to have at least one of capital expenditures and R&D expenditures non-missing. Consequently, our sample starts from 1977 and ends 2005, including 57,223 firm-year observations. Finally, we exclude financial firms (firms with one-digit SIC of six). Our main sample (the "full sample") has a total of 53,354 firm-year observations between 1977 and 2005. We examine the relation between firm investment levels (capital expenditures and R&D expenses) and the (mis)valuation level of the firm's equity (our misvaluation measures, B/P and V /P , are described below). We relate the firms' investment during each fiscal year to the firms' misvaluation measure that is calculated at the beginning of the fiscal year. For example, for a firm with December fiscal year end, we relate the misvaluation measure calculated at the end of December 2003 to the investment level for fiscal year ending in December 2004.
Our sample includes firms with different fiscal year-ends. To line up firms in calendar time for the cross-sectional analysis, we use June as the cut-off. We allow for a fourmonth gap from the fiscal year end for the accounting data to be publicly available. correctly), and among firms that have high share turnover (a measure of the degree to which current shareholders have short time horizons). This suggests that managers invest in order to boost the shortterm stock price, a 'catering' policy. Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) find that greater dispersion in analyst forecasts of earnings is associated with higher aggregate equity issuance and capital expenditures.
10 Discretionary accruals are hypothesized to be related to misvaluation because investors fail to distinguish between cash flows and accounting adjustments to earnings. Dispersion of analyst forecasts is hypothesized to correlate with investment because optimistic investors buy the stock but pessimists fail to sell short. Some authors, however, have argued that the ability of these variables to predict returns reflects rational risk effects.
11 For example, if investors are in agreement in overvaluing a firm, the overvaluation would not be captured by a dispersion of analyst forecast measure. Similarly, a firm can be misvalued without an active effort by managers to manipulate earnings. These considerations suggest that it is useful to test the misvaluation hypothesis using a more inclusive measure of misvaluation.
Under this timing convention, for calendar year t, we include firms with fiscal year ends no later than February of year t, and no earlier than March of year t−1. For the majority of firms, the investment expenditures actually occur one calendar year prior to the test year. For example, for year 2005, the investment expenditures for firms with December fiscal year end (the majority of firms) actually occur between January and December of 2004, and the misvaluation measure is calculated in December 2003. We compare the investment levels cross-sectionally among sample firms each year, and aggregate the comparison results across time.
Investment and Control Variables
We measure firms' investment activities using the following accounting data from COM-PUSTAT annual files: capital expenditures [Item 128] and Research and Development expenditures [Item 46]. Our investment variables, CAP X, RD, and T OTIN V (CAP X + RD), are scaled by previous year total assets [Item 6]. 12 As in previous studies on investment and valuation, all variables, include the ones described below, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate the influence of outliers. Panel A of Table  1 reports summary statistics of the investment variables. We do not delete a firm-year observation simply because a certain variable is missing. For example, there are about 60% as many RD observations as CAP X, and we do not delete CAP X for a certain year simply because RD is missing for that year.
In the multivariate tests, we examine how investment levels depend on valuation measures, B/P and V /P , controlling for other investment determinants. These control variables include cash flow [Item 14 + Item 18 + RD] scaled by lagged assets (missing RD is set to zero in the cash flow calculation), and Tobin's q, defined as the market value of equity plus assets minus the book value of equity [Item 60 + Item 74] all over assets (see, e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) , and Polk and Sapienza (2006) ). In addition, we include leverage (LEV ) as the ratio of long-and short-term debt to the sum of long-and short-term debt and stockholders' equity [(Item 9 + Item 34)/(Item 9 + Item 34 + Item 216)], equity issuance defined as the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings (∆Item 60 + ∆Item 74 −∆Item 36) scaled by lagged assets, following the definition in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) , and (to control for firm riskiness) monthly return volatility (SIGMA) estimated over the previous five years or at least two years if there are missing observations. Except for cash flow and equity issuance, which are measured over the fiscal year, all control variables are measured at the start of the fiscal year. Table 1 , Panel B presents summary statistics of these control variables.
Motivation for and Calculation of Mispricing Proxies
The reliability of the inferences we draw about the misvaluation hypothesis of corporate investment rests upon the quality of our misvaluation proxies, B/P and, primarily, V /P . The validity of our approach, however, does not require that either book value or residual income value be a better proxy than market price for rational fundamental value. We merely require that these measures contain substantial incremental information about fundamentals above and beyond market price, as would be the case if market price contains substantial non-fundamental variation.
In support of the B/P proxy, an extensive literature finds that firms' B/P ratios are remarkably strong and robust predictors of the cross-section of subsequent one-month returns (see, e.g., the review of Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) ). Psychologybased theoretical models imply that B/P is a proxy for misvaluation, and thereby will predict subsequent abnormal returns (see, e.g., Barberis and Huang (2001) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) ). Market values reflect both mispricing, risk, and differences in true unconditional expected cash flows (or scale). Book value can help filter out irrelevant scale differences, and so B/P can provide a less noisy measure of mispricing (see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) ). On the other hand, B/P is a natural proxy for risk as well. An active debate remains about the extent to which B/P -based return predictability reflects a rational risk premium or correction of mispricing. 13 The association of B/P with subsequent abnormal returns suggests that there is a misvaluation or risk component to the variation of B/P . However, B/P has been used as a proxy not just for misvaluation or for risk, but for growth opportunities and for the degree of information asymmetry (Martin (1996) ). Furthermore, proxies for Tobin's q that are highly correlated with B/P have been employed to measure the quality of corporate growth opportunities and the degree of managerial quality or discipline. A further source of noise in B/P for our purposes is that book value, the numerator of B/P , is influenced by firm and industry differences in accounting methods.
We calculate B/P as a ratio of equity rather than total asset values, because it is equity rather than total misvaluation that is likely to matter for corporate investment decisions; a similar point applies for V /P . Since equity is more sensitive than debt to firm misvaluation, it is more profitable for an overvalued firm to issue equity than debt to finance a project. Furthermore, firms face catering pressures specifically to maintain a high stock price, rather than a high total firm value. For example, a high stock price helps protect a firm from hostile takeover, from proxy battle, and from delisting.
There is also strong support for V /P as an indicator of mispricing. Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) find that aggregate residual income values predict one-monthahead returns on the Dow 30 stocks better than aggregate B/P . Frankel and Lee (1998) find that V is a better predictor than book value of the cross-section of contemporaneous stock prices, and that V /P is a predictor of the one-year-ahead cross-section of returns. Furthermore, Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003) report that the abnormal returns associated with high V /P are partially concentrated around subsequent earnings announcements. They also report that after controlling for a large set of possible risk factors (including beta, size, book/market, residual risk, and loadings from the Fama and French (1996) three-factor model), V /P continues to predict future returns significantly. These findings make V /P an attractive index of mispricing. 14 The residual income value has at least two important advantages over book value as a fundamental measure. First, it is designed to be invariant to accounting treatments (to the extent that the 'clean surplus' accounting identity obtains; Ohlson (1995) ), making V /P less sensitive to such choices. Second, in addition to the backward-looking information contained in book value, it also reflects analyst forecasts of future earnings.
Of course, it is possible that in the process of filtering out extraneous information, some genuine information about mispricing is also filtered out from V /P . In our sample, the correlation of B/P with V /P is fairly low, 0.185. Thus, V /P potentially offers useful independent information beyond B/P regarding misvaluation. This is to be expected, as much of the variation in book/market arises from differences in growth prospects or in managerial discipline that do not necessarily correspond to misvaluation.
Turning to procedure, we calculate the B/P proxy as the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity. Each month for each stock, book equity (Item 60) is measured at the end of the prior fiscal year. 15 Market value of equity is measured at the end of the month.
Our estimation procedure for V /P is similar to that of Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) . For each stock in month t, we estimate the residual income model (RIM) price, denoted by V (t). With the assumption of "clean surplus" accounting, which states that the change in book value of equity equals earnings minus dividends, the intrinsic value of firm stock can be written as the book value plus the discounted value of an infinite sum of expected residual incomes (see Ohlson (1995) ),
where E t is the expectations operator, B(t) is the book value of equity at time t (negative B(t) observations are deleted), ROE(t + i) is the return on equity for period t + i, and r e (t) is the firm's annualized cost of equity capital. For practical purposes, the above infinite sum needs to be replaced by a finite series of T − 1 periods, plus an estimate of the terminal value beyond period T . This terminal value is estimated by viewing the period T residual income as a perpetuity. Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) report that the quality of their V (t) estimates was not sensitive to the choice of the forecast horizon beyond three years. 16 Of course, the residual income V (t) cannot perfectly capture growth, so our misvaluation proxy V /P does not perfectly filter out growth effects. However, since V reflects forward-looking earnings forecasts, a large portion of the growth effects contained in B/P should be filtered out of V /P .
We use a three-period forecast horizon:
15 Using the definition as in Baker and Wurgler (2002) for book equity value does not change our results materially but reduces our sample size. 16 The residual income valuations are also likely to be less sensitive to errors in terminal value estimates than in a dividend discounting model; pre-terminal values include book value, so that terminal values are based on residual earnings rather than full earnings (or dividends). For example, D'Mello and Shroff (2000) found that in their sample of repurchasing firms, firms' terminal value was on average 11% of their total residual income value, whereas using a dividend discount model the terminal value was 58% of total value.
where f ROE (t + i) is the forecasted return on equity for period t + i, the length of a period is one year, and where the last term discounts the period t + 3 residual income as a perpetuity. 17 Forecasted ROE's are computed as
and where f EP S (t + i) is the forecasted EPS for period t + i. 18 We require that each of these f ROE 's be less than 1.
Future book values of equity are computed as
where k is the dividend payout ratio determined by
and D(t) and EP S(t) are respectively the dividend and EPS for period t. Following Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) , if k < 0 (owing to negative EPS), we divide dividends by (0.06 × total assets) to derive an estimate of the payout ratio, i.e., we assume that earnings are on average 6% of total assets. Observations in which the computed k is greater than 1 are deleted from the study. The annualized cost of equity, r e (t), is determined as a firm-specific rate using the CAPM, where the time-t beta is estimated using the trailing five years (or, if there is not enough data, at least two years) of monthly return data. The market risk premium assumed in the CAPM is the average annual premium over the riskfree rate for the CRSP value-weighted index over the preceding 30 years. Any estimate of the CAPM cost of capital that is outside the range of 3%-30% (less than 1% of our estimates) is winsorized to lie at the border of the range. Previous studies have reported that the predictive ability of V /P was robust to the cost of capital model used (Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999) ) and to whether the discount rate was allowed to vary across firms (D'Mello and Shroff (2000)). We checked the robustness of our main findings using the alternative constant discount rate of 12.5% (following D'Mello and Shroff (2000)). The results were generally similar to those reported here.
The benchmark for fair valuation is not equal to 1 for either B/P or V /P , for two reasons. First, book is an historical value that does not reflect growth. Second, residual income model valuations have been found to be too low on average. Thus, our tests consider relative comparisons these misvaluation proxies: higher (lower) values of B/P or V /P indicate relative undervaluation (overvaluation).
Panel C of Table 1 reports summary statistics the two valuation ratios. We retain negative V values caused by low earnings forecasts, because such cases should also be informative about overvaluation (price high relative to expectations of profitability). We use V /P as a measure of undervaluation rather than P/V as a measure of overvaluation, because negative values of P/V should indicate over-rather than under-valuation. For consistency we also use B/P rather than P/B. Removing negative V /P observations (about 5% of the sample) tends to reduce statistical significance levels in our tests without materially altering the results.
Conditioning Variables
Previous research has documented that proxies for the degree of financial constraints and the degree of investor short-termism affect the relationship between misvaluation and capital expenditures. As discussed in the introduction, there is theoretical motivation for such tests. Here we offer tests for these effects using an overall ex ante measure of misvaluation, V /P , that is purified of growth effects. The first conditioning variable we examine is the KZ index, as defined in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) , a measure of financial constraints. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) show that corporate investment should be more sensitive to stock valuation level in financially constrained firms (high KZ index). Following Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) and Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) , the original KZ index for year t is defined as a linear combination of 5 variables, CF t (cash flow scaled by lagged total assets); DIV t (cash dividends (Item 21 + Item 19) scaled by lagged assets); C t (cash balances (Item 1) scaled by lagged assets); LEV t (leverage ((Item 9 + Item 34)/(Item 9 +Item 34 + Item 216))), and q t (Tobin's q as defined earlier).
Since q contains market price, it should be correlated with market misvaluation, and has been used as a misvaluation proxy in past literature. To avoid using a conditioning variable for financial constraint that contains the misvaluation effects we are testing for, following Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) we construct a four-variable version of the KZ index (excluding q) for year t:
Second, Polk and Sapienza (2006) examine a catering theory that the investment sensitivity to misvaluation will be higher when there is a higher fraction of short-term investors. They document that the sensitivity of capital expenditures to misvaluation is higher for stocks with high share turnover. We measure share turnover as monthly trading volume as a percentage of total number of shares outstanding. 19 Third, firm size, as measured by total assets, captures several effects. Small firms Should be more prone to market misvaluation than large firms because of greater uncertainty and information asymmetry between investors and insiders, and lower liquidity, and should be more subject to certain catering pressures. Small firms also tend to have less access to external capital.
Panel D of Table 1 reports summary statistics of the conditioning variables that potentially influence valuation-sensitivity. These three variables are not highly correlated with each other, with the highest correlation being only 0.052 (between the KZ index and total assets). In the tests to follow, we examine how market valuations affect capital expenditures and R&D investment in the full sample, as well as in subsamples formed based upon these variables. Table 2 also shows that overall, V /P is higher than B/P . The V /P mean (median) of 0.733 (0.628) is substantially greater than the B/P mean (median) of 0.669 (0.515). V /P has a higher mean than B/P each year after 1993, except for the year 2002; V /P has a higher median value each year after 1986.
Time Patterns in Investment and Valuations

How Misvaluation Affects Investment: Univariate Tests
This section provides univariate tests of the effect of misvaluation on tangible and intangible corporate investment. Each year, firms are grouped into quintile portfolios according to either B/P or V /P of the month preceding each fiscal year start. The valuation portfolios are formed annually to ensure that any effects we identify are cross-sectional, and therefore not driven by time-series swings in market valuation and investment activities. Each year mean investment levels are computed for each quintile. Finally, we compute the time-series mean of the investment levels for each quintile. Table 3 reports how under-or over-valuation is related to the capital expenditures and R&D activities. Mean values of B/P or V /P , and the investment variables CAP X, RD, the sum of the two investments (T OTIN V ), and their differences between top and bottom valuation firms are reported.
Full Sample Tests
We begin by examining the relation of investment to misvaluation in the full sample. Table 3 reports the relation of investment measures to B/P and V /P quintiles. It is evident that high-valuation firms (as measured by either B/P or V /P ) invest more in both capital spending and R&D. Investment levels (CAP X, RD, and T OTIN V ) all increase monotonically with valuations; the most overvalued quintile measured by B/P (V /P ) invests 11.51% (10.58%) more in total investment (capital expenditures and R&D) than the most undervalued quintile. All these quintile differences are highly statistically significant, with t-statistics all exceeding 4.64. The B/P evidence could reflect either misvaluation, or (under the q theory) that firms with strong growth opportunities invest more. The results using our purified misvaluation measure (V /P ) confirm that misvaluation affects corporate investment.
Furthermore, the evidence strongly supports the further implication of the misvaluation hypothesis, that intangible investment is more sensitive to misvaluation than tangible investment. RD is more sensitive to misvaluation as measured by V /P than CAP X. The most overvalued V /P quintile invests 8.30% more in RD, but only 2.12% more in CAP X, than the most undervalued quintile. In the full sample, the misvaluation sensitivity ratio (the ratio of interquintile spread of investment to the spread in valuation) for RD is 5.32, whereas the misvaluation sensitivity ratio for CAP X is only 2.12.
These findings highlight two immediate insights from tests using the purified V /P misvaluation measure as compared with B/P . First, R&D is much more sensitive to measured misvaluation than is evident using B/P . In the full sample, the difference in RD between the most over-and undervalued quintiles using V /P , is 8.30%, is larger than the 5.54% using B/P , and the misvaluation sensitivity ratio for R&D using V /P of 5.32, exceeds that of B/P , 4.25.
Second, capital spending as measured by CAP X is much less sensitive to measured misvaluation than is evident using B/P . The difference in CAP X between the most overand undervalued quintiles of 2.12% using V /P is much less than the 6.18% difference using B/P . Thus, the misvaluation sensitivity ratio for CAP X using V /P of 2.12 is far lower than the CAP X sensitivity ratio of 4.53 for B/P . Thus, V /P provides a sharply different conclusion about the relative sensitivity to misvaluation of tangible versus intangible investments. Using B/P one would conclude that tangible investment, CAP X, has slightly higher sensitivity to misvaluation than does intangible investment, measure RD (4.53 > 4.25). However, this conclusion seems to come from the fact that B/P contains information about growth prospects, rather than from misvaluation effects. Using V /P , intangible investment is far more sensitive to misvaluation (RD sensitivity to V /P is 5.32 than is tangible investment (CAP X sensitivity to V /P is only 2.12).
Conditions Affecting the Sensitivity of Investment to Misvaluation
We now test different possible reasons why misvaluation affects investment. Previous research has suggested that misvaluation should affect investment more among firms that are financially constrained (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) ), and that the effect of misvaluation on investment should be stronger when investors have shorter time horizons (Polk and Sapienza (2006) ). We form subsamples based upon the Kaplan and Zingales index, and based upon turnover, to test these theories. These tests differ from those in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) in our use of a misvaluation measure that focuses on equity rather than total firm misvaluation, and which is purified of earnings growth effects. Our tests differ from those in Polk and Sapienza (2006) and Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman (2005) in using an overall misvaluation measure (i.e., a deviation of price from a measure of fundamental value), rather than proxies for particular sources of misvaluation. Furthermore, our tests differ from previous literature in examining separately the effects of misvaluation on tangible versus intangible investment, and in considering conditionings based upon misvaluation categories. We will see that these differences offer further insights about why some firms may find it hard to take advantage of equity overvaluation. Finally, we investigate whether there are systematic differences in the misvaluation effects on investment between large and small firms. We form size portfolios based upon total assets.
How Financial Constraints Affect the Sensitivity of Investment to Misvaluation
We first test the effects of misvaluation on investment among firms that are more versus less financially constrained, as measured by high versus low levels of the KZ index. According to the theory of Stein (1996) as extended by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) , financially constrained firms should be more equity-dependent, and therefore possess high investment sensitivity to market valuation. This theory is confirmed in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) using q as a valuation measure and the KZ index as a measure of financial distress. Table 4 presents our univariate findings, where high financial constraints are identified as firms with above-median KZ index, and low constraints with below-median KZ index. For B/P , the univariate evidence fails to support a difference in misvaluation sensitivities between sets of firms with different financial constraints. For CAP X, the inter-quintile B/P spread is −1.61 among high KZ index firms, and only −1.09 among low KZ-index firms. In the high-KZ subsample (Panel A), the most highly valued firms invest 7.61% more in capital expenditures than the lowest valuation firms; the ratio of this difference in capital expenditures to the difference in B/P is 4.72. In the low-KZ subsample (Panel B), the most highly valued firms invest 4.69% more in capital expenditures than the lowest valuation firms; the ratio of this difference in capital expenditures to the difference in B/P is 4.47. The two investment sensitivities (4.72 and 4.47) are therefore only minimally different, and Panel C indicates no significant difference in these sensitivities.
For RD, the inter-quintile difference in RD is identical among high-KZ and low-KZ firms (4.65%). Since the B/P spread is smaller among low-KZ firms, this means that investment is more sensitive to B/P among the low-KZ, financially unconstrained firms. Specifically, the sensitivity ratio among high-KZ firms is only 3.12, whereas the sensitivity ratio among low-KZ firms is a far larger 4.52. Panel C indicates that this difference in sensitivities is highly significant (t = −3.70).
For T OTIN V , the sum of CAP X and RD, the difference between the top and bottom valuation firms is higher among the high-KZ firms (11.40%) than among low-KZ firms (9.46%). However, since the B/P valuation spread is smaller among the low-KZ firms, the sensitivity of T OTIN V to B/P , 9.14, is actually greater than the sensitivity among the high-KZ firms, 7.28. Panel C indicates that this difference is significant (t = −3.61). Overall, the B/P evidence is not consistent with the theory.
However, B/P mixes misvaluation effects with growth effects, whereas the theory of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler is focused on the sensitivity of investment to misvaluation. Indeed, when valuations are measured by V /P , the findings for capital expenditures are quite different. We find reasonably supportive evidence for the model prediction for CAP X-more financially constrained firms seem to have higher sensitivities to misvaluation. Interestingly, for RD and for total investment (T OTIN V ), the pattern is reversed-more financially constrained firms have lower sensitivities of RD to misvaluation.
In Panel A, for the high-KZ subsample, the most overvalued firms (based on V /P ) have substantially higher CAP X, 2.53%, than the most undervalued firms. This difference corresponds to a misvaluation sensitivity ratio for CAP X of 2.25. In Panel B, the corresponding quintile difference in CAP X for low-KZ firms is only 1.39%, though this difference is still highly statistically significant (t = 3.16). This difference corresponds to a misvaluation sensitivity ratio of 1.74. This point estimate is indeed lower than the estimated sensitivity for the high-KZ subsample, although Panel C indicates that the difference is only marginally significant (t = 1.89).
In contrast, the V /P evidence for R&D shows a much lower RD sensitivity to misvaluation among high than among low-KZ firms. In the high-KZ subsample (Panel A), the most overvalued quintile invests 5.05% more in R&D than the most undervalued quintile, which corresponds to a misvaluation sensitivity ratio of 3.25. For the low-KZ Subsample (Panel B), the most overvalued quintile invests 8.87% more in R&D than the most undervalued quintile, which corresponds to a far larger misvaluation sensitivity ratio of 6.35. Panel C indicates that the difference in sensitivities is highly significant (t = −7.80).
Furthermore, high-KZ firms also have lower sensitivity of overall investment (T OTIN V ) to V /P than do low-KZ firms. For instance, in the high-KZ subsample, overvalued firms invest 7.59% more than undervalued firms, for a misvaluation sensitivity ratio of 5.52. The corresponding T OTIN V difference among the low-KZ subsample is 10.62%, for a much higher misvaluation sensitivity of 8.32. Panel C indicates that the difference in sensitivities is highly significant (t = −5.16).
In summary, using our preferred measure of misvaluation (V /P ), the univariate evidence indicates that for intangible investment (R&D), investment sensitivity is much stronger for firms that are financially unconstrained. Why are findings for intangible investments in an unexpected direction? A possible explanation is that financial distress affects differently a firm's ability to exploit misvaluation through tangible versus intangible investment. Theory tells us that distress interferes with the creation of intangible assets, since customers, employees and suppliers are reluctant to commit to firm-specific investments, such as the time and effort required to build relationships with the firm (see, e.g., Titman (1984) ). A distressed firm faces reluctance on the part of parties, either within or outside the firm, whose inputs would be complementary with intangible investments by the firm. Thus, as a distressed firm becomes more overvalued (or less undervalued), it may not be able to usefully increase its investment in intangibles as easily as it can increase its investment in tangible assets. Table 5 shows the univariate relationship between investment and valuation for subsamples sorted by share turnover. Polk and Sapienza (2006) hypothesize that high-turnover firms should have higher investment-valuation sensitivity because these firms have shortterm investors. Table 5 shows that this prediction is confirmed in the univariate test using an overall measure of misvaluation, V /P . We begin with the findings for B/P , recognizing that this could reflect either misvaluation or growth effects. All three investment measures -CAP X, RD, and T OTIN V , show a higher sensitivity to B/P in the high-turnover subsample than in the low-turnover subsample. For example, in the high-turnover subsample, the most highly valued quintile based on B/P invests 7.03% more in capital expenditures than the lowest valuation quintile, implying a valuation sensitivity of 5.21; the corresponding difference is 4.35% for the low-turnover subsample, for a valuation sensitivity of only 3.24. A similar point holds for R&D.
How Investor Time Horizons Affect the Sensitivity of Investment to Misvaluation
Using V /P , the most overvalued quintile invests 2.02% more in capital expenditures than the most undervalued quintile for a valuation sensitivity of 2.25; the corresponding difference is only 1.02% for the low-turnover subsample, for a valuation sensitivity of only 1.03. As in the full sample, R&D is more sensitive to valuation than capital expenditures. Furthermore, consistent with stronger misvaluation effects when investors have short time horizons, the difference in R&D sensitivity between the high-and low-turnover subsamples is greater than the difference in capital expenditures sensitivity. Table 6 reports the univariate investment-valuation relations for subsamples sorted by total assets. When valuation is measured by B/P , small firms appear to have higher sensitivity of CAP X to valuation than do large firms. The valuation sensitivity ratio of 5.13 for small firms is significantly higher than the sensitivity ratio of 3.87 for large firms (t = 4.31). However, using the purified measure V /P , the misvaluation sensitivity ratio for large firms is not significantly higher than that for small firms, (a difference of 0.36, t = 0.91). This finding indicates that the difference in sensitivity of CAP X to B/P between large and small firms derives from growth opportunities rather than misvaluation, i.e., that small firms have a higher sensitivity of CAP X to growth opportunities than do large firms.
How Firm Size Affects the Sensitivity of Investment to Misvaluation
In contrast, sorting misvaluation by either B/P or V /P , small firms have higher sensitivity of R&D to misvaluation than large firms. Using B/P , the sensitivity of small firm RD to misvaluation is 1.99 higher than the sensitivity of large firms (t = 4.31); using V /P , this difference in valuation sensitivity between small and large firms is even higher (3.00; t = 10.28). In particular, among small firms, the most overvalued firms according to V /P invest 14.82% in R&D, more than triple the R&D of the most undervalued firms (4.66%). We discuss the reasons for these differences when we consider multivariate tests in Subsection 4.2.4. controls we use are Tobin's q, cash flow scaled by lagged assets, leverage, return volatility, equity issuance scaled by lagged assets, and 2-digit SIC major industry dummies as defined by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) .
We perform Fama-MacBeth style regressions cross-sectionally each year, so that the B/P and V /P measures, as well as the investment variables, are compared crosssectionally, in order to eliminate possible spurious effects arising from time-series swings in these variables. Table 7 reports the time-series weighted averages and t-statistics of the coefficients of the regressions for the full sample, where the weight is the number of firms in each yearly regression. The dependent variables are CAP X, RD, and T OTIN V .
We report four regression specifications for each dependent variable.
(1) We regress on B/P and controls.
(2) We regress on V /P and controls. (3) We include both B/P and V /P (dropping q since q and B/P capture similar information) (4) We add equity issuance as a further regressor to specification (3). We use (3) to examine whether there is incremental explanatory power from V /P as a misvaluation measure given B/P . If so, this provides a fairly stringent confirmation that the identified effect is a result of misvaluation, rather than the earnings growth prospects that are correlated with book/market. We draw our main inference from specifications (3) or (4), which are more stringent than (1) and (2) as tests of the misvaluation hypothesis. Table 7 presents regression results for the full sample. The coefficient of −0.479 (t = −3.40) on V /P in specification (2) indicates that V /P has a significant negative relation to CAP X for the full sample-undervalued firms invest less. B/P is highly significant, so as a conservative test we additionally control for B/P in specifications (3) and (4). V /P remains significant both in regression (3), which omits equity issuance, and regression (4), which includes it.
Full Sample Tests
The effect of misvaluation on R&D is impressive. The coefficient on V /P is highly significant in all specifications. In regression (3), which controls for B/P , V /P has a coefficient of −1.999 (t = −7.89). The coefficients on V /P in the R&D regressions are roughly four times greater than the coefficients in the CAP X regressions. This is consistent with the univariate tests ( Table 3 ) which show that RD has a much higher sensitivity to V /P than does CAP X. Finally, T OTIN V (the sum of CAP X and RD) is also highly sensitive to V /P ; the V /P coefficient in the T OTIN V specification (3) is −2.453 (t = −8.36).
A comparison of models (3) and (4) for each of the dependent variables shows that the coefficient on V /P decreases only modestly when the equity issuance variable EI is included. This is similar to the findings of Polk and Sapienza (2006) for CAP X using discretionary accruals as a misvaluation proxy
To gauge the economic importance of the investment-valuation relation, we examine the effect of a one-standard-deviation shift in V /P on investment levels; and compare this to the effect of a comparable shift in cash flow. Table 1 shows that the standard deviations of V /P and cash flow are 0.672 and 13.65%, respectively (where cash flow is expressed as a percent of total assets). According to the T OTIN V regression specification (3), a one-standard-deviation shift in V /P therefore implies a 1.65% (2.453 × 0.672) change in T OTIN V (where investment is expressed as a percent of total assets.) As a benchmark for comparison, a one-standard-deviation shift in cash flow implies a 4.16% (0.305 × 13.65) change in the investment ratio. These estimates indicate that misvaluation explains about 40% as much as cash flow of the variation in capital expenditures.
The sensitivities of RD to misvaluation and to cash flow are much closer. The corresponding sensitivities are 1.34% and 2.03% for one-standard-deviation shifts in V /P and cash flow, respectively. So V /P explains about 2/3 as much as cash flow of the variation in RD.
Since our fundamental proxy V is measured with error, it is important to consider whether measurement error is likely to be correlated with capital expenditures or R&D, which could bias our tests. As discussed in Section 2 analysts have finite forecasting horizons, so we calculate a terminal value based on the available forecasts (which for the majority of our firms go to 5 years).
Even if much or most of the payoff on the firm's current investment will arrive in the distant future, these expected payoffs are captured by our calculations to the extent that some of this payoff arrives in time (usually, within 5 years) to be reflected in the analyst forecasts used in our terminal value calculation. Nevertheless, for long-term investments whose payoffs do not begin to arrive within 5 years, V is likely to be underestimated. Such underestimation of V will reduce V /P , creating a bias toward overvaluation. This creates the possibility of a spurious relation between CAPX or RD with V /P . For example, if R&D investment leads to highly deferred payoffs, one might conjecture that underestimation of V is especially great for firms with high R&D.
It seems unlikely that this effect would drive our findings, since the estimated sensitivity of R&D with V /P is stronger than the estimated relation of R&D with B/P .
Book value incorporates even less information about future earnings prospects than does V , so if the omission of expected future profits were driving our results, we would expect this bias to generate even stronger results for B/P than for V /P . 20 Nevertheless, we perform further robustness checks to see whether this effect might be driving our findings. In our first robustness check, we divide the sample into two subsamples, those for which we do or do not possess analyst long-run growth forecasts (starting in 1983, when IBES begins reporting long-run growth forecasts). The firms in our sample without long-run growth forecasts have earnings forecasts going forward only two years. Although the sample sizes are reduced, we find (not reported in tables) that within both subsamples, our basic findings obtain. Both CAPX and R&D are increasing with V /P , and the slope coefficient is larger for R&D than for CAPX.
These subsamples differ greatly in average firm size, since large firms tend to receive more long term growth forecasts. As a further robustness check, we split each subsample further into size terciles. To ensure a large enough sample size for each size quintile for the regressions, we use the break points for the subsample with smaller firms (the subsample of firms that do not have long-run growth forecasts). Again the main conclusions obtain, that CAPX and RD are increasing with V /P , and the slope coefficient is larger for RD than for CAPX.
A second potential bias in our tests derives from the fact that analyst forecasts are biased. The mere fact of analyst forecast bias does not necessarily bias our tests. This would only be a problem if the size of analyst forecast bias is correlated the level of investment. Nevertheless, as a further robustness check, we avoid the problem of biased analyst forecasts using ex post V for calculating V /P . In other words, we substitute ex post earnings instead of ex ante earnings forecasts into the formula for V . 21 Again (results not reported in tables), we have verified that our basic findings are robust to the use of ex post rather than ex ante V /P ; both CAPX and RD are increasing with V /P , and the slope coefficient is larger for RD than for CAPX.
Subsample Tests
Different versions of the misvaluation hypothesis offer interesting predictions about the sensitivity of investment to misvaluation in different subsamples of firms. We therefore perform several subsample tests.
One set of tests involves examining separately firms that are in different misvaluation quintiles. When a firm is undervalued, fixed costs of equity issuance may limit equityfinanced investment. If undervalued firms are less likely to issue equity, then a reduction in the undervaluation may not increase the scale of equity issuance and investment much. In contrast, if firms that are overvalued often issue equity, then an increase in overvaluation is likely to increase the scale of issuance and investment among issuers substantially. Similarly, if projects have a minimum technologically efficient scale, then a reduction in undervaluation may matter little for an inframarginal project that is being rejected anyway, whereas an increase in overvaluation is likely to increase the scale of the adopted project.
An alternative reasoning based upon catering potentially yields a similar implication. Managers of overvalued firms may be particularly anxious to undertake overvalued investments in order to satisfy investors' overly optimistic perceptions. The prevalence of such managerial behavior is discussed by Jensen (2005) , who warns that such effects are likely to be found among overvalued firms.
Thus, arguments based upon the equity channel and based upon catering both imply that investment will be more sensitive to valuation among overvalued firms. We test these ideas by measuring the investment sensitivity to misvaluation within subsamples of firms sorted into misvaluation quintiles.
The main empirical prediction of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) is that the sensitivity of investment to misvaluation is strongest among equity-dependent firms. We test this by measuring investment sensitivities in subsamples sorted by the Kaplan/Zingales index. To test for the effect of investor time horizon upon catering incentives (Polk and Sapienza (2006) ), we perform subsample tests sorting by turnover. Finally, we examine how the effects of misvaluation on investment vary with firm size.
The lower transparency and liquidity of small firms implies stronger misvaluation effects (see also footnote 24). However, if the cost of issuing equity for small firms is very high (so that even overvalued small firms seldom issue equity), limited access of small firms to equity markets can dampen the sensitivity of their equity-financed investment to misvaluation. Furthermore, the managers of small firms are likely to face stronger pressures to cater to investor beliefs than large firms, because small firms are likely to be held by a less sophisticated investor base (small investors), and are more subject to hostile acquisitions and delisting pressures than large firms when market valuations are low.
We report the subsample results in Tables 8-11, for each of the valuation, KZ, turnover, and size subsamples. Table 8 describes the relation between investment sensitivity to misvaluation level as measured by V /P among firms in different misvaluation categories. It is evident that the misvaluation effect on investment is almost entirely among the top 2 misvaluation quintiles. Among each of the bottom 3 misvaluation quintiles, there is no significant relationship between either CAP X or RD with V /P . In Panel A where model (3) is considered, for CAP X, the V /P effect is significant only among the top 2 quintiles, with a significant 5 − 1 inter-quintile difference in coefficient of 2.204 (t = 3.34). A similar pattern exists for R&D: the effect is only present in the top 2 quintiles, but within these two it is very strong. For example, for the most overvalued quintile, the V /P effect on RD is −10.451 (t = −6.48). Finally, for T OT IN V the effect is highly significant within the top overvaluation quintile, with some indication of significant effect in the next two quintiles. We reach a similar conclusion from Panel B, where the V /P coefficient is from regression model (4) that includes the equity issuance variable EI, even though V /P turns somewhat less significant than when EI is omitted. In sum, misvaluation affects investment primarily among the top one or two overvaluation quintiles.
Valuation-Quintile Regressions
KZ-Subsample Regressions
Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) provide evidence that financially constrained firms have greater sensitivity of investment to misvaluation. Our tests differ in two main ways. First, we examine equity B/P instead of total firm q, based on our argument that it is equity misvaluation that is most relevant for equity financing decisions. Second, we examine V /P , our misvaluation proxy that is purified of growth effects, along with tests that include B/P as an additional control for growth. Table 9 provides a test of the prediction of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) that high-KZ firms have capital expenditures that are more sensitive to misvaluation (V /P ) than low-KZ firms. Consistent with the prediction, in CAP X regression model (3) of Panel A, the coefficient of V /P is largest for the highest-KZ quintile significant (−0.764; t = −2.93). Indeed, this is the only KZ quintile in which V /P achieves significance at the 5% level. However, the difference in V /P coefficients between the top and bottom KZ quintiles is statistically insignificant. 22 Similar results obtain when model (4) is used in Panel B.
The relationships for R&D are stronger, and surprising. As with the univariate result, low-KZ firms have R&D that is highly sensitive to misvaluation as measured by V /P . Furthermore in the multivariate tests, the R&D investment of low-KZ firms is more sensitive to misvaluation than high-KZ firms. In RD regression model (3), the V /P coefficient for the lowest-KZ quintile is −3.098 (t = −6.69), about four times the sensitivity for the highest-KZ quintile (coefficient −0.775; t = −4.96).
Finally, consistent with the univariate evidence, high-KZ firms have total investment that is less sensitive to misvaluation than low-KZ firms. In the T OT IN V model (3) regression, the V /P coefficient for highest-KZ firms is −1.361 (t = −4.31), compared with −3.707 (t = −8.83) for lowest-KZ firms. This result arises from that fact that R&D investment has higher sensitivity to valuation than capital expenditures.
Thus, the multivariate evidence offers relatively little support for the Baker, Stein, and Wurgler financial constraints theory as applied to tangible investments (capital expenditures). The multivariate tests also confirm strongly that other forces are operating when it comes to the relation between misvaluation and intangible investment (R&D).
Why is the R&D of unconstrained (low-KZ) firms especially sensitive to misvaluation? A plausible explanation is that firms that are financially constrained are limited in their freedom to engage profitably in R&D because of the need for financial flexibility. One reason for this is that stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, or customers may be reluctant to commit to long-term relationships with a firm that is subject to distress, and the inputs of such stakeholders may be especially important for the success of investments designed to generate intangible assets. Furthermore, intangible investments generate real options, making it especially valuable for the firm to have the flexibility to spend heavily in the future.
For example, firms with heavy R&D activity such as pharmaceutical firms tend to maintain low leverage ratios, presumably to maintain flexibility in investment. For firms that are more financially constrained, an increase in overvaluation may encourage equity issuance for purpose of investing in R&D relatively little compared to firms with low financial constraints. In other words, if the possibility of distress greatly reduces the expected profitability of a firm's intangible investment, greater overvaluation may do little to make such investment attractive.
Turnover-Quintile Regressions
Turning to the effects of investor short-termism on investment, Table 10 reports regression results for the turnover quintiles. Examining model (3), which controls for growth as reflected in B/P , we see that high-turnover firms have higher sensitivity than lowturnover firms of R&D to valuation, but that this is not the case for CAP X. For CAP X, there seems to be no trend in the V /P coefficient across the turnover quintiles. Thus, the univariate finding that high-turnover firms have higher sensitivity of CAP X to misvaluation is not robust to controlling other investment determinants such as B/P and cash flow. 23 R&D, on the other hand, is highly sensitive to V /P among both high and low turnover firms, with a much greater sensitivity (−2.952; t = −7.83) for highest-turnover firms than for lowest-turnover firms (−1.494; t = −5.91). Overall, the highest-turnover firms have total investment (T OT IN V ) that is more than twice as sensitive to V /P as the total investment of lowest-turnover firms (−3.867 versus −1.843). Thus, using our overall measure of misvaluation, we strongly confirm that the conclusion of Polk and Sapienza (2006) , that the effects of misvaluation are stronger among high turnover firms, can be extended to RD instead of CAP X.
In sum, we find that there is strong evidence for catering with respect to R&D expenditures. Polk and Sapienza (2006) provide evidence for catering based upon the relation between discretionary accruals and capital expenditures being stronger among high turnover firms. We find that the relation of R&D to our overall measure of misvaluation, V /P , is also stronger among high turnover firms. Table 11 reports the regression results for quintiles sorted by Size as measured by total assets. Consistent with the univariate finding, for CAP X, there is no clear trend in the V /P coefficient across the size quintiles, by either model (3) or model (4). Also consistent with the univariate test, in the RD regressions, small firms show a much higher sensitivity of RD to misvaluation than do large firms. For example, examining model (3), the V /P coefficient for the smallest-firm quintile is −3.133 (t = −7.73), nearly seven times the coefficient for the largest-firm quintile (−0.450; t = −3.87).
Size-Quintile Regressions
Why do small firms have higher sensitivity of R&D to misvaluation? Small firms should be more prone to misvaluation because of lower availability of information to investors, lower liquidity, and more severe short-sales constraints. 24 Small firms also face greater pressure to cater to investors. The opaqueness of small firms may make their R&D projects especially hard to value, in which case occasions to cater with R&D are more common.
Conclusion
We examine the relation between corporate investment-capital expenditures and R&Dand equity misvaluation as measured by book/price (B/P ), or by the ratio of residual income valuation to price (V /P ). We draw our main inferences using V /P , because V /P allows us to determine whether a relation between a market misvaluation proxy and corporate investment is due to the effects of mispricing rather than profit growth prospects.
We find, consistent with the misvaluation hypothesis, that capital expenditures and, strongly, R&D, are positively related to the firms degree of overvaluation, after controlling for several other investment determinants. The stronger effect on R&D is consistent with the hypothesis that misvaluation effects are stronger for investments that are harder to value.
To further probe the economic sources of these effects, we examine whether the effects of misvaluation on capital expenditures and R&D differ in subsamples of firms in which the degree of misvaluation, the degree of financial constraint, the investor time horizon, or firm size differ. We discuss several reasons why misvaluation effects should be stronger among more overvalued firms, and find empirically that misvaluation affects investment only among the top one or two overvaluation quintiles.
The theory and evidence of Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) indicates that investment is more sensitive to Tobin's q among equity-dependent firms. We find that the R&D expenditures of financially constrained firms are much less sensitive to market misvaluation than those of unconstrained firms. This finding presents an intriguing puzzle. We suggest two possible explanations. First is that the benefits to exploiting overvaluation to finance intangible growth opportunities is lower when financial constraints reduce flexibility and the willingness of stakeholders to provide complementary inputs. Second is that R&D creates real options, which are most valuable for firms with financial flexibility.
In tests for the effect of investor time horizon, we find that the sensitivity of R&D, but not capital expenditures, to valuation is higher among high-turnover firms. This suggests that catering pressures to maintain short-term valuation are more relevant for intangible than for tangible investment, consistent with the hypothesis that intangible investments are more prone to being misvalued by investors.
Owing to the greater opaqueness and lower liquidity of small firms, small firms should be more prone to misvaluation than large firms, which suggests greater misvaluation effects on investment for small firms. For the equity channel, however, a potentially opposing effect is that large firms have greater access to equity markets than small firms.
We find that small firms do not have a higher sensitivity of capital expenditures to misvaluation than do large firms, but do have a much higher sensitivity of R&D to misvaluation. A possible explanation is that the pressure to cater is especially important for intangible investment and for small firms.
In sum, we find that there is evidence in favor of the misvaluation hypothesis using an overall measure of market misvaluation that filters out earnings growth prospects by using a forward-looking fundamental measure; the effects of misvaluation are very different for tangible and intangible investment; and that conditional tests provide further insight into the sources of misvaluation effects.
The evidence of misvaluation effects on investment in the cross-section raises the question of whether misvaluation affects aggregate patterns of corporate investment activity as well. As discussed in the introduction, the methods used in existing studies have not been able to resolve sharply whether the relation between stock prices and investment derives from rational effects or misvaluation. The use of an overall aggregate misvaluation proxy from which contaminating growth effects are removed, and the separate examination of tangible versus intangible investment, may help resolve whether and why misvaluation affects corporate investment in the macro-economy. The sample includes U.S. non-financial firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S coverage during 1977-2005. The investment variables include capital expenditures (CAPX), R&D expenditures (RD), and total investment expenditures (TOTINV) (sum of the two), all scaled by lagged assets for each fiscal year. q is Tobin's q ratio measured as market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity over total assets. CF is cash flow (Item 14 + Item 18 + RD) over the fiscal year scaled by lagged assets (missing RD is set to zero in the CF calculation). Leverage (LEV) is defined as (Item 9 + Item 34)/(Item 9 + Item 34 + Item 216). EI is equity issuance (∆Item 60 + ∆Item 74 -∆Item 36) during the fiscal year, scaled by lagged assets. SIGMA is the monthly stock return volatility during the five year period (or, at least two years) preceding the fiscal year. B/P is the book equity to price ratio. V/P is the residualincome-value to price ratio. KZ index is a measure of financial constraints as defined in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) but with q omitted, with high index indicating high level of constraints. Turnover is monthly trading volume scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Except for the investment variables in Panel A, and cash flow (CF) and equity issuance (EI) in Panel B, which are measured over each fiscal year, all other control variables, valuation variables, and valuation sensitivity variables are measured in the month preceding the beginning of each fiscal year. We choose the most recent fiscal year accounting data available at the end of June each year so that each sample firm appears once for a particular year. Total assets figures are in 2005 dollar. All variables are winsorized at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. year. Also reported are the mean and median of B/P, the book equity to price ratio; and V/P, the residual-income-value to price ratio. Each sample firm appears once for a particular year. N is the number of observations each year with nonmissing CAPX or RD or both. All variable entries are mean values unless specified as median (Med) .
Year Each year, firms are sorted into quintile portfolios according to the beginning-of-fiscal-year book to price ratio (B/P), or residual-income-model-value to price ratio (V/P). The valuation portfolios are formed annually and include firms with no restriction on fiscal year-end month. Each year, mean investment levels are computed for each valuation quintile. Finally, time-series mean of the investment levels for each quintile is computed. This table reports the time-series mean of capital expenditures (CAPX), R&D expenditures (RD), and total investment expenditures (TOTINV) (sum of the two), all scaled by lagged total assets for each fiscal year, for each valuation portfolio. Difference in investment levels between the most over-and under-valued portfolios, and the associated t-statistic of the difference, are also reported. N is the time-series average number of firms in each portfolio with non-missing CAPX or RD or both. Panels A and B report results for subsamples sorted by the beginning-of-fiscal-year Kaplan-Zingales (1997) financial constraints index (omitting q from the index). The bottom row in panels A and B reports the time-series mean of the yearly investment-valuation sensitivity ratio, defined as the ratio of interquintile spread in investment to the spread in valuation (measured by either B/P or V/P) for each investment category. Panel C reports the time-series mean and associated t-statistic of the difference in investment-valuation sensitivity ratio between the high and low KZ subsamples. A and B reports the time-series mean of the yearly investment-valuation sensitivity ratio, defined as the ratio of interquintile spread in investment to the spread in valuation (measured by either B/P or V/P) for each investment category. Panel C reports the time-series mean and associated t-statistic of the difference in investment-valuation sensitivity ratio between the high and low turnover subsamples. , and total investment expenditures (TOTINV) (sum of the two), all scaled by lagged total assets for each fiscal year, for each valuation portfolio. Difference in investment levels between the most over-and under-valued portfolios, and the associated t-statistic of the difference, are also reported. N is the time-series average number of firms in each portfolio with non-missing CAPX or RD or both. Panels A and B report results for subsamples sorted by the beginning-of-fiscal-year firm size (total assets). The bottom row in panels A and B reports the time-series mean of the yearly investment-valuation sensitivity ratio, defined as the ratio of interquintile spread in investment to the spread in valuation (measured by either B/P or V/P) for each investment category. Panel C reports the time-series mean and associated t-statistic of the difference in investment-valuation sensitivity ratio between the large and small size subsamples. 
